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Abstract
The paper highlights how the rationales and instruments of industrial policy have changed since the 
1960s. It finds that theories of industrialization have come full circle, as many of the assumptions 
behind the market failure paradigm have made a comeback. The policy implications of these 
theories, however, have not been similarly resurrected. It makes an explicit comparison between 
the strategies of East Asia and Latin America, and reviews the explanations for their divergent 
performance. It identifies a “back to the future” quality of Latin America’s situation, pointing to the 
region’s balance of payments constraint and dependence on commodity-like industrial products.
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Helen Shapiro
The paper will review the impact of industrial policy on growth in developing countries from the 1960s until 
the present. This is a propitious time to conduct such an assessment. Within policy-making and academic 
circles, extremely critical views of state intervention in general, and industrial policy in particular, are no lon-
ger as dominant, and have given way to more nuanced approaches. This opening allows for a reassessment of 
earlier policies from today’s vantage point, as well as reflection about new challenges posed by global produc-
tion and constrained policy options.
The paper will make an explicit comparison between the strategies of East Asia and Latin America. 
These are the most industrialized regions within the developing world, accounting for 80 per cent of manu-
facturing value added (Lall, Albaladejo and Moreira, 2004: 9). East Asia’s income and manufacturing growth 
rates have surpassed those of Latin America, and much of the literature on industrial policy engages in 
explicit comparison between the regions and offers explanations for their diverging performance. 
Why Industrial Policy?
It is useful to recount briefly the motivating factors behind the push to industrialize, if only to place the 
subsequent policies in their historical context. The economic arguments pointed to the secular deterioration 
in the terms of trade for poor countries’ raw material and agricultural exports, differing income elasticities 
of demand for agricultural and industry (Engel’s curves), and more generally, how high productivity growth, 
considered the basis of rising per capita income, was only attainable through industrialization.1 It also re-
flected the political pressures and interests behind economic autonomy following political independence in 
some countries, export pessimism from both the collapse of commodity prices and world trade in the 1930s, 
and the post-war protectionism in Europe and elsewhere. There was also a relatively hospitable international 
climate, in which US international agencies and multilateral institutions supported such initiatives. In this 
context, returning to a dependence on raw material exports was considered both economically unviable and 
politically problematic.2
In their arguments promoting government intervention, many early development economists 
focused on a “missing factor’ – capital, technology, entrepreneurship –which was unlikely to emerge from 
market forces alone. Therefore, different methods were required to elicit these missing ingredients for 
growth. Imperfect capital markets, for example, were unlikely either to generate sufficient savings or allocate 
them efficiently without some form of market intervention. Technological and pecuniary externalities lead 
to underinvestment. In addition, investors’ expectations were often based on past experience, requiring some 
kind of ‘inducement’ mechanism to elicit investment in new industrial activities (Hirschman, 1958, 1977).
With respect to capital, some focused on low domestic savings rates and the need to harness foreign 
capital in the form of aid or direct investment (Lewis, 1955). Gerschenkron (1962) argued that the greater 
relative backwardness of modern less-developed countries, in contrast to previous industrializers, required a 
1  See Prebisch (1950, 1959) and Singer (1950) on the terms of trade; Maddison (1994) on growth and industrialization.
2  See Kaufman (1990) and Haggard (1990) for the political economy of this period.2  DESA Working Paper No. 53
leap into the most modern, capital-intensive sectors. In the face of this challenge, and equipped with a weak 
private sector and scarce capital, only the state had the capacity to mobilize and allocate resources. Others 
saw the problem from a Keynesian perspective as one of motivating investors, rather than as one of scarce 
savings. Due to the prevalence of pecuniary externalities, Nurkse (1953), Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), and Sci-
tovsky (1954) argued that governments need to coordinate investment decisions and promote a ‘Big Push’. 
Despite these differences, there was broad consensus around the basic assumption that development 
required non-marginal change that market forces alone could not generate.3 The goal was to reallocate re-
sources to industry from agriculture or raw materials. The strategy involved changing the incentive structure 
to redirect them. 
There were two other implicit, but ultimately, questionable, assumptions that experience would later 
make apparent. The first had to do with the nature of technological change. The development process was 
typically portrayed as one of factor accumulation and technology, like labour and capital, was viewed as just 
another missing factor. Embodied in capital, it could be imported and, assuming fixed-technology produc-
tion functions, applied in the same methods as in the country of origin. The second had to do with the state 
and technocratic omniscience. State planners, armed with input-output tables from industrialized countries, 
and given the assumptions about technology, could simply allocate resources accordingly and leapfrog into 
the modern industrial era.
Neoclassical Backlash4
The first neoclassical reaction to state-guided industrialization aimed at the associated costs. Using new 
analytical tools such as effective rates of protection and domestic resource costs, these authors showed that 
industrial policies were inefficient and tried to correlate ‘distorted’ policy regimes with poor economic per-
formance (Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970; Balassa, 1982). Their critique was bolstered by the success of 
export-oriented countries such as South Korea and Taiwan which at the time were thought to have non-in-
terventionist states. Their rapid growth in comparison to economies which followed inward-oriented strate-
gies seemed to provide empirical validation that dynamic gains could be had from free trade (Krueger, 1984).
This debate between old-style development economists and more orthodox theorists, however, still 
centred on market failure and whether intervention was necessary. In the 1980s, a second wave of critique at-
tacked the early development economists’ implicit belief in the efficacy of government intervention. Various 
models of the interaction between the state and private actors pointed to the possibility that ‘bureaucratic 
failure’ could be worse than ‘market failure’. Krueger (1974) argued how quantitative restrictions on imports 
led firms to compete for import licenses and their attached rents, thereby squandering resources in unpro-
ductive, rent-seeking activities. This approach came to a different explanation for the relative success of East 
Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) – the pressures of international competition mitigated against 
the worse sort of rent seeking observed in countries practicing more inward-oriented industrialization.
This literature was correct in its claim that state intervention does not necessarily lead to efficient 
outcomes. The lack of a theory of the state was less problematic for neoclassical theory, which at least as-
sumed that markets function and presupposed a minimal role for government. In contrast, the omission of 
3  Ellis (1958) and Viner (1953) were early exceptions to this approach, each expressing more faith in market-based 
solutions. 
4  This section is based on Shapiro and Taylor (1990).Industrial Policy and Growth          3
the state as an explicit actor is a fundamental flaw in the development theorists’ argument, since they relied 
upon the state as an agent of change and presumed that it had the requisite political autonomy and adminis-
trative tools to carry out the task. 
Empirical Findings and Emerging Consensus
Although early in this debate, some claimed that the East Asian NICs had relatively free trade and non-
interventionist governments, it soon became clear that the governments were extremely interventionist. 
Subsequently, a huge literature has documented how all late industrializing countries followed quite similar 
strategies and relied on the same policy instruments to kick-start industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s. 
They all tried to substitute imports with domestic production and used government planning to target prior-
ity sectors. They used selective protection (tariffs, quotas, import licensing, and foreign exchange rationing), 
domestic content requirements, and subsidized credit. In her survey of twelve countries that had success-
fully moved into mid-technology industries, Amsden (2001) found that the public sector had a large role 
in capital formation in the 1960s that diminished over time; even where development banks per se were 
insignificant, government played a large role in credit allocation through the banking system. What’s more, 
they each targeted the same group of basic industries.5 Even sceptics of import substitution such as Bruton 
have concluded that with respect to policy instruments, their similarities outweigh their differences. Look-
ing at effective rates of protection, he points out how high effective rates of protection were not necessarily 
correlated with poor results, as “a number of countries, later achieving outstanding success, showed the same 
sort of protection picture as did later failures” (Bruton, 1998: 912). 
A key difference among these countries was how fast and how extensively they moved into manu-
facturing exports. While some inward-oriented countries such as Mexico and Brazil grew at fast rates during 
the 1960s and 1970s, the East Asian export-oriented countries grew even faster.6 This challenged the long-
standing export pessimism of development economists. Although Latin American manufactured exports also 
grew in the 1970s, they were a much smaller share of both total manufacturing value added and of gross 
domestic product (GDP). They also failed to keep up with imports, as the region entered into the balance-
of-payments crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In light of these performance indicators, East Asian 
export-led growth came to be seen as a more effective industrialization strategy.
Based on the conclusion that East Asian success was due to its outward orientation, and in the wake 
of the debt crisis in Latin America, countries were encouraged by the World Bank and others to liberalize 
trade. The assumption was that the anti-export bias of import-substitution policies, along with the lack of 
domestic competition, discouraged innovation and encouraged rent-seeking behaviours. These micro inef-
ficiencies, in turn, had led to macro imbalances and slower growth rates. Exports and import competition 
would have dynamic effects through learning and innovation. 
Subsequent work by Rodrik (1995a) and others point out how these assumptions about the gains 
from trade are open to question. The static efficiency costs of import substitution turn out to be relatively 
small and cannot explain slower growth. The dynamic learning effects from trade in East Asia are also open 
to dispute. Rodrik argues that in the case of South Korea’s innovative firms, causation may have been from 
efficiency to exporting, rather than the other way.
5  The countries include China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, and Turkey. Argentina is the one exception with respect to government’s role in capital formation.
6  The comparative performance figures on industrialization and growth have been well documented. See World Bank 
(1993).4  DESA Working Paper No. 53
Additional work by Amsden (1994), Fishlow and others (1994) and Wade (1990) also countered 
the emphasis on outward orientation and focused on the efficacy of East Asia’s selective interventions. In this 
framework, exports are a reflection of their governments’ superior ‘reciprocal control mechanisms’ (Amdsen, 
1994). All these governments required some kind of performance targets in exchange for special favours – 
ranging from exports, domestic content, research and development (R & D) spending, or financial arrange-
ments – but they were not as extensive or effective. 7
The conclusion that selective industrial policies led to East Asian success is by no means universally 
accepted (Nolan and Pack, 2003). However, to the extent that their contributions are seen as consequen-
tial, the conditions that allowed for their efficacy are seen as nonreplicable. The capacity of governments 
elsewhere to enforce reciprocity commitments is questioned; markets are therefore required to enforce this 
discipline on firms. The focus in policy-making once again shifted to state, rather than market, failure, just 
when the theoretical development literature began to move in the opposite direction.
Theory and Practice Divide
In contrast to the 1960s, a kind of schizophrenia began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s as theory and 
practice moved in opposite directions. Governments in Latin America and elsewhere weakened or dismantled 
the public institutions associated with state-led industrialization and liberalized trade. Pressure mounted on 
East Asian countries to do the same, although they moved more slowly in this direction. Concurrently, various 
international trade agreements institutionalized these market-driven reforms by committing countries to free 
trade, and prohibiting industry-related policies such as trade-related investment measures and export subsidies.
Just as these reforms were being vigorously promoted, their theoretical foundations were being un-
dermined. Many of the underlying assumptions about market failure which motivated industrial policies of 
the 1960s – and were subsequently dismissed as irrelevant in the 1980s -- have made an astounding come-
back in development economic theory. In addition, new approaches to technical change and innovation, 
some originating in the literature on firm competitiveness, have challenged previous assumptions about firm 
behaviour. Together, they have generated a huge literature documenting how market forces will not produce 
optimal results and that some kind of state intervention is necessary to promote industrialization. Based on 
these theoretical findings, this literature has also proposed new explanations for East Asia’s success, and helps 
shed light on Latin America’s relatively poor performance.
Although repackaged in formalized models, the arguments behind coordinating investment or a 
‘Big Push’ have changed little since first proposed by Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse and Scitovsky more than 50 
years ago. In the presence of increasing returns, industrialization in one sector raises demand for other sectors 
and makes large-scale production in these sectors more profitable. The presence of these pecuniary externali-
ties makes different firms’ and industries’ profits interdependent and thereby provides a rational for a govern-
ment-coordinated investment strategy. As argued by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishy (1989: 1024), “a program 
that encourages industrialization in many sectors simultaneously can substantially boost income and welfare 
even when investment in any one sector appears unprofitable.” 
7  For example, Brazil had a target program in place by 1970, which gave firms access to duty-free imports in exchange 
for exports. By 1990, as much as half of total exports were covered by this program. As early as the 1960s, India had 
an export program for textiles, which failed due to the lack of capital for restructuring. Similar incentives were offered 
to other industries in 1970, but the government failed to enforce the export requirements. Ironically, when trade was 
liberalized in the 1990s, similar programs were more effective (Amsden, 2001).Industrial Policy and Growth          5
The notion that countries can be stuck in a low-level equilibrium trap has also made a comeback, as 
it has been show that multiple equilibria can exist in the face of pecuniary externalities driven by increasing 
returns. Under these conditions, making the transition from so-called ‘cottage production equilibrium’ to 
‘industrialization equilibrium’ (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishy, 1989: 1004), which entails specializing in differ-
ent types of manufacturing, is the challenge countries face. This echoes a point made long ago by Gerschen-
kron, among others, about backwardness and inertia-that more than a market signal is required to displace 
the previous equilibrium in order to make non-traditional investment projects attractive (Shapiro and Taylor, 
1990).
What this work suggests, in contrast to traditional models of comparative advantage, is that a coun-
try’s specialization pattern determines its rate of growth (Ros, 2000, 2001). This literature also offers new 
explanations for the success of East Asia and the relative failure of Latin America that have focused not on 
prices or exports but on investment. As suggested by Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishy (1989: 1025), “countries 
such as South Korea that have implemented a coordinated investment program can achieve industrialization 
of each sector at a lower explicit cost in terms of temporary tariffs and subsidies than a country that indus-
trializes piecemeal. The reason is that potentially large implicit subsidies flow across sectors under a program 
of simultaneous industrialization.” Ros (2001) and others attribute East Asia’s success to policy interventions 
which sped up the transition from one pattern of production to another.
The acknowledgement that sectors are not all equal in a world of differential returns to labour and 
capital reflects the insights from the literature on firm strategy and competitiveness. In contrast to the passive 
price-taking firms of comparative statistics, this literature portrays successful firms as those that create and 
maintain barriers to entry and the rents associated with them. By exploiting ‘competitive’ advantages based 
on innovation, firms are then not dependent on unsustainable cost advantages such as low wages or exchange 
rates. According to this logic, a firm’s strategy must be to avoid price-competitive sectors, vulnerable to forces 
beyond its control (Porter, 1980). 
By extension, a ‘competitive’ nation does not specialize in these sectors, either. In explicit contrast 
to theories of comparative advantage, a country’s competitive advantage is determined by innovation rather 
than factor endowments. For Porter (1990), this means that national policies should help create an environ-
ment of demanding consumers, domestic competition, strong supplier linkages, and good infrastructure.8 
Amsden, focusing on late-developers, also puts firms and their technological capacity at the heart of 
development. Their ability to shift away from primary resources to knowledge-based assets—a set of manage-
rial and technological skills that allow them to either produce a product “at above prevailing market prices 
(or below market costs)”—determines a country’s long-term growth (Amsden, 2001: 3). In contrast to the 
standard emphasis on getting the macro right, the starting point for Amdsen and others9 is the firm.
The treatment of technology also distinguishes this work from early development economists. Rath-
er than a missing factor akin to capital or labour, knowledge or technology is portrayed as a learning process. 
As Lall (2003: 15) puts it, “industrial success in developing countries depends essentially on how enterprises 
8  Porter claims that import-substitution policies failed to create this type of environment and subsequently failed. It 
should be noted that this work was based primarily on firms in advanced, industrialized countries. Moreover, related 
work on developing countries generally addresses the challenge of creating competitive, domestically owned firms, as 
opposed to transnationals, which dominate manufacturing in Latin America. For more on this latter point, see Shapiro 
(2003). 
9  See Nelson and Winter (1982), Best (2001), Lall 2001, Paus (2005), and Katz (1996).6  DESA Working Paper No. 53
manage the process of mastering, adapting and improving upon existing technologies. The process is difficult 
and prone to widespread and diffuse market failure.” In this world of imperfect information and technology 
rents, the firm is not a competitive, price-taker implicit in most macro approaches. Moreover, public support 
is crucial to help build their technological capabilities. In recent decades, the competitive pressures to be near 
the technological frontier have only increased with the fall in trade barriers and transportation, communica-
tion and information costs (Amsden, 2001: 282).
This work on the firm and the assumption of imperfect information and information externalities, 
particularly with respect to technology, has challenged what has been the dominant view of rents since Krue-
ger’s classic 1974 article. Since then, rents and rent-seeking were portrayed as the main scourge of develop-
ment and the trump card against any selective state interventions, even in the presence of market failure. 
Correspondingly, domestic barriers to entry and the lack of foreign competition, which enabled a rent-seek-
ing environment, were seen as reducing the incentive to innovate.
Now, the acknowledgement that rents are at the heart of technological change and not simply 
politically derived is ubiquitous in the theoretical and empirical literature on the micro-foundations of 
development. Free trade, rather than forcing firms to innovate, may simply force them out of business if the 
productivity gap with foreign competitors is too large. Using the findings from endogenous growth models, 
in which R & D is a key factor in determining a firm’s competitiveness, and the finding that losses from mo-
nopoly power may be secondary to losses associated with underinvestment in specialized goods and services, 
it provides a new twist to old infant industry arguments. For example, Traca (2002) argues that temporary 
protection, which would allow firms to maintain market share and increase returns, is warranted for firms 
if they are far from the technological frontier. Otherwise, they would not be able to maintain market share 
and returns necessary to sustain the costs of R & D necessary to become internationally competitive. Rodrik 
(2004) also makes the case that firms will invest in risky non-traditional activities only with the assurance 
that their rents will not dissipate from foreign or domestic competition.10 These works are helpful in explain-
ing the divergent performances of regions since liberalization.
Performance
During the 1980s and 1990s, Latin America’s total and per capita growth rates did not compare favourably 
with either East Asia or its own 1950-1980 performance. Some countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, 
and Uruguay, did experience faster growth rates in the 1990s than during the import-substitution period, 
but the largest economies of the region, Brazil and Mexico, did not. Even when the analysis is refined to 
identify each country’s particular years of crisis and recovery, as opposed to comparing only the 1980s with 
the 1990s, the overall annual growth rate of 4 per cent during recovery did not match the overall base period 
rate of 5 per cent (Hofman, 2000). With respect to investment, while the region regained its 1980 average 
rate of 21 per cent as a share of GDP by the late 1990s, neither Brazil nor Mexico had recovered its previ-
ous peak. Moreover, the region’s average was no where near the average of East Asia, nor was it sufficient to 
reduce significantly employment and poverty levels (Stallings and Peres, 2000: 77-78). With the exception of 
Chile, the growth that has been achieved came largely from high rates of capacity utilization, raising ques-
tions about sustainability.
10  Work by political scientists on Latin America also documents how economic liberalization does not eliminate 
incentives for rent-seeking but generates different ones. See Shamis (1999).Industrial Policy and Growth          7
Latin America’s performance in manufacturing was also relatively weak. From 1980 to 2000, manu-
facturing value added (MVA) in the developing world as a whole grew by 5.7 per cent, as compared to 2.3 
per cent in the industrialized countries.11 MVA grew by 9.1 per cent in East Asia, 6.5 per cent in South Asia, 
4.8 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa, 1.7 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and only 1.4 per cent 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. As a result, Latin America’s share of the developing world’s MVA fell 
from 48 per cent to 22 per cent, while East Asia’s rose from 29 per cent to 58 per cent. On a per capita basis, 
the Latin American region is still the most industrialized, but that lead is diminishing. Even when only the 
1990s growth rate is considered, if Mexico is excluded, the region’s MVA grew at only 1.9 per cent. (Mexico 
grew at 4.4 per cent, which, according to Lall and others, was largely due to the trade benefits derived from 
NAFTA, rather than from liberalization per se.) Moreover, that growth rate is still lower than both the 
import-substitution period and that of East Asia. Indeed, manufacturing is no longer the engine of growth in 
the region, as its share of GDP has been falling.12
In contrast to its lagging performance in manufacturing, Latin America and the Caribbean did shift 
to exports at a fast rate. The region’s manufacturing exports grew faster than MVA from 1981-2000, as did 
global manufacturing exports. Due to sluggish growth in the 1980s, the region’s exports grew at 10 per cent, 
following East Asia at 13.4 per cent and South Asia at 11 per cent. It was the leader during the 1990s, how-
ever, growing at almost 15 per cent a year, compared to 11.6 per cent for East Asia. The share of developing 
country manufactured exports from Latin America and the Caribbean fell from 25 per cent to 19 per cent, 
while that of East Asia rose from 52 per cent to 69 per cent. East Asia’s share of global manufactured exports 
increased from 7 per cent to 18 per cent over this period, while Latin America and the Caribbean saw its 
share fall from 3.2 per cent to 2.4 per cent. As a whole, the developing world’s share of global exports rose 
from 13 per cent to 27 per cent. 
The sectoral breakdown of manufacturing also diverged between the regions. In many Latin Ameri-
can countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Peru, the fastest growing industries are those 
that process natural resources. In Mexico and Central America, there has been a shift towards labour-inten-
sive assembly operations, mostly for export. Generally, labour-intensive sectors geared for the domestic mar-
ket faired poorly, as did capital goods and consumer durables. The motor vehicle industry is an exception. 
It was also industrial commodities and the automotive industry which saw the greatest improvements in 
productivity, approaching the technological frontier (Benavente and others, 1996; Katz and Stumpo, 2001).
This rise in resource-based activities is in contrast to global trends. In global manufacturing, the 
share of resource-based and low-technology activities in total manufacturing fell, as that of medium- and 
high-tech activities grew. In Latin America, resource-based activities, starting from a higher base than East 
Asia, increased their share to 40 per cent, while they declined to less than 30 per cent in East Asia. Medium- 
and high-technology sectors grew at 16 per cent in East Asia, as compared to 6 per cent in Latin America. As 
a result, the overall share of medium- and high-tech in manufacturing is almost 60 per cent in East Asia, as 
compared to less than 50 per cent in Latin America.
Likewise, developing countries overall have moved into high- and medium-technology exports, 
which are also the categories showing the highest growth rates. Resource-based exports showed the slowest 
growth rates, falling from 23 per cent of manufacturing exports in 1981 to 13 per cent in 2000. As put by 
Lall, Albaladejo, and Moreira (2004: 15), “Given the general rise in the share of HT (high tech) in trade, 
11  Data from Lall (2003) and Lall, Albeladejo and Moreira (2004). 
12  This trend started in the 1970s, but accelerated in the 1980s and 1990. See Benavente and others (1996).8  DESA Working Paper No. 53
export success is now increasingly associated with the ability of countries to move into these products. This 
is as true of developing and industrialized countries, and the most competitive countries in the developing 
world are shifting rapidly into HT exports.” In contrast, the structure of Latin America’s exports reflects that 
of manufacturing more generally. The medium-tech automotive industry was the largest category, followed 
by natural resource processing industries, foodstuffs and primary commodities. High-tech exports followed.
Explanations for Performance
A variety of explanations has been put forth to explain the different rates of growth across regions. Some 
have suggested that liberalization hasn’t gone far enough. Most have emphasized the need for complementary 
‘second-generation’ reforms which focus on institutions and regulations, rather than simply macro stabiliza-
tion and liberalization. Many have argued that in regards to industrial performance, it is difficult to disasso-
ciate industrial policies or the lack thereof from the broader macroeconomic environment. In Latin America, 
for example, overvalued exchange rates combined with trade liberalization during the 1990s hit import-com-
peting industries particularly hard.
The literature that emphasizes industrialization and firm capabilities suggests different causal factors. 
One is the relative decline in R & D spending in Latin America. According to a variety of indicators, the 
gap in technological capacity between Latin America and countries such as South Korea, China, Taiwan, and 
India, is growing. These include R & D spending in manufacturing, and the private sector’s share in R & D 
expenditure (Amsden, 2001: 277-278). In its comprehensive study of Latin American competitiveness in a 
global context, the Inter-American Development Bank supports Amsden’s conclusions. It finds that East Asia 
(excluding China) spent five times more on enterprise-financed R & D than Latin America and the Carib-
bean, and that “the gap is likely to be rising sharply over time” (Lall, Albaldejo, and Moreira, 2004: 43).
The reasons behind this growing gap are hard to specify.13 One may be the fact that governments in 
countries such as India, Korea, China, and Taiwan have historically promoted R & D and technology to a 
greater extent than those in Latin America, and have continued to do so. These programs have both support-
ed capabilities for domestic firms and pressured foreign companies to invest in local R & D and to maximize 
spill-overs.14 Lall (2003:21-22) suggests that this also explains differing performances within East Asia. 
Latin America’s R & D gap may also reflect how sectors with a relatively high level of technologi-
cal content were hit hard by the combination of free trade and overvalued exchange rates. Those industries, 
which had spent more intensively on R & D, have had difficulty competing with imports from more indus-
trialized advanced countries (Katz and Stumpo, 1995). Brazil is an exception to this regional trend, and may 
have been more successful in retaining industries with high engineering content precisely because it reduced 
its trade barriers relatively late. Benavente and others (1996: 62) conclude, “It is very likely that the high 
level of complexity reached by the metal product and machinery sectors, the scale of the domestic market 
and the higher level of protection maintained up to the early 1990s strongly influenced the fact that Brazil 
maintained an industrial structure more oriented towards dynamic and technologically advanced sectors than 
the other countries of the region.” In short, this work suggests that Latin America suffered from too much 
liberalization, too soon, rather than too little, too late.15 
13  Lall, Albaladejo and Moreira (2004) suggest, but do not analyze, possible explanations for this gap. 
14  For details on these programs, see Lall (2003), Amsden (2001), Wade (1990), and Rodrik (1995b).
15  In the UNDP’s Human Development Report 2003, Stiglitz also points out that East Asia was slower to reduce trade 
barriers, liberalize capital accounts, and still used selective policies. Lall (2003: 9) points out that India also liberalized 
more slowly and selectively, and performed better in terms of growth in manufactured value added. Industrial Policy and Growth          9
In her survey of late developing countries, Amsden (2001) comes to a similar conclusion about how 
the timing of liberalization matters, particularly with respect to the relative strength of domestic and trans-
national firms. Countries outside of Latin America that opened relatively late and had supported domestic 
firms were more likely to retain medium- and high-tech industries. In the recent phase of mergers and 
acquisitions that has taken place in all of the late developing countries to enhance scale economies, Taiwan, 
China, Korea and India were more likely to have national firms strong enough to survive and/or to be viable 
as joint venture partners.
This raises the question of whether the greater role of foreign firms in manufacturing in Latin 
America has any implications for its relatively weak performance compared to East Asia. Interestingly, the 
theoretical literature cited above on the need to coordinate investment or to protect firms until they reach 
the technological frontier or generate adequate returns fails to mention ownership, implicitly assuming that 
the firms are independent and nationally owned. Much of the literature on competitiveness makes similar 
assumptions, and does not consider the ramifications of transnational firms’ global strategies on national 
industrial development.16
In Latin America, foreign firms have dominated the most dynamic manufacturing sectors since 
their inception, and their control has increased since liberalization. According to Garrido and Peres (1998), 
sales by the biggest 100 industrial firms in Latin America broke down as follows for 1996: 40.2 per cent by 
private, national firms; 57.3 per cent by private, foreign firms; and 2.5 per cent by state-owned firms. The 
share held by private national firms had fallen from 45.9 per cent in 1990. Even large national conglomer-
ates which held dominant positions in their local markets found themselves poorly positioned to confront 
trade liberalization. 
Evidence suggests that transnationals invest virtually nothing in local R & D in developing countries 
(Amsden, 2001: 207). This may put even successful sectors at risk. According to Lall, Albaladejo and Mor-
eira (2004: 13), “The few outstanding successes in LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) in manufactured 
exports face severe competitive challenges. Export activity is often de-linked from local industry and capa-
bilities, and the competitive base will be eroded unless these links are greatly strengthened. While this is also 
true of some East Asian countries, others have built impressive local capabilities and even the weaker ones 
are acutely conscious of the need to develop local capabilities-and are investing in doing so more assiduously 
than the leaders in LAC.” 
Transnational firms also have the option of confronting new competitive pressures by integrating 
their subsidiaries into their global production networks. This can involve limiting national production to 
particular product lines and complementing them with imports, or importing parts and components for 
final assembly. In regard to Argentina, Kosacoff (2000: 188) writes: “In short, the data show that the manu-
facturing sector has itself utilized trade openness and economic deregulation to increase its imports not only 
of parts and components but of finished production, too. This is indicative of a trend towards the vertical 
de-integration of activities that affects both manufacturing activities… and commercialization activities….”
As a result of these processes, intermediate and supplier industries are drastically shrinking. Even 
should relative comparative advantage indicators change, in some sectors there may be no domestic substi-
tutes remaining to replace imports, and they are difficult to regenerate. Given the importance attributed to 
16  Porter’s The Competitive Advantage of Nations, based primarily on firms in advanced, industrialized 
countries, deals almost exclusively with national firms. For a discussion of related works on developing 
countries, see Shapiro (2003).10  DESA Working Paper No. 53
these sectors, the potential consequences for future development are dire. For example, Porter and others 
who have focused on the role of geographic agglomeration have emphasized the importance of strong sup-
plier linkages for innovative firms (Porter, 1990; Krugman, 1991).17 Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996: 57) 
suggest that new sources of innovation may be concentrated at the intermediate, rather than the final, output 
stage of production, and see “the proliferation of intermediate inputs and producer services as the essential 
part of economic development and growth.” 
This pattern has also led to balance-of-payments concerns. Numerous studies have shown that trans-
national firms in Latin America are leading an ‘import-intensive’ or ‘deficit-prone’ industrialization process. 
While exports of natural resource processing industries, foodstuffs, and primary commodities have grown 
fast, imports of capital goods and labour-intensive products are growing even faster, so the manufacturing 
trade balance is increasingly negative. Economic concentration has increased, as transnational subsidiaries 
and large national firms are in a better position to take advantage of this new environment; small and me-
dium sized firms are losing out, many of whom had been suppliers to big firms and are now being replaced 
by imports.
Kosacoff (2000) argues that in Argentina, vertical de-integration and the increased dependence on 
imports explain why the costs of adjustment were higher, and growth in output, slower, than anticipated in 
the 1990s. Moreno Brid (2000) raises similar issues about Mexico. Using a balance-of payments-constrained 
growth model, he shows how Mexico’s income elasticity of import demand has doubled over the last 15-20 
years.18 Looking at Brazil, Miranda argues that the intensive use of imported intermediate goods will not be 
sustainable.19 As a result of these factors, Ocampo (2004-5: 296) concludes that “the multiplier effects and 
the technological externalities generated by the high-growth activities associated with exports and FDI have 
been weak.” 
In sum, in the context of a favourable international climate, domestic liberalization and macroeco-
nomic stability, and rapid export growth, Latin America’s GDP growth rates have been disappointing. They 
haven’t matched earlier growth rates or those in East Asia. In addition, resource-based activities “continue 
to dominate manufacturing and there has been a general downgrading of the technology structure” in small and 
medium sized economies (Lall, Albaladejo, and Moreira, 2004: 31).
Moreover, the few successes in manufacturing cannot be attributed to liberalization per se. With 
the exception of maquila industries, all of these sectors were established under import-substitution regimes. 
In Latin America, natural resource processing industries received state support. This came in the form of 
financial and technical support to non-traditional agriculture and forestry, or as subsidies in the 1970s and 
1980s to help firms invest in state-of-the-art, capital-intensive processing plants.20 To the extent that freer 
trade did not lead to large-scale restructuring in most of the late-industrializing countries, Amsden (2001: 
266) concludes that “the resource allocation of the developmental state appears to have been efficient enough 
to withstand the market test.” 
17  The firm strategy literature criticizes import substitution and trade protection for creating weak supplier networks. 
Enright, Frances, and Scott Saavedra (1994) argued that import liberalization would both provide firms with access 
to the highest quality inputs and force domestic supplier industries to innovate. Instead, the speed of liberalization, in 
combination with foreign firms’ access to global sources, forced out many domestic suppliers. See also Fairbanks and 
Lindsay (1997).
18  On Mexico, see also Dussel Peter (1996).
19  Miranda (2000), cited in Katz and Stumpo (2001).
20  See Meller (1995) and French-Davis (1997) on support to Chilean agriculture; see Bisang, Burachik and Katz (1995) 
and Stumpo (1995) on capital-intensive processing plants.Industrial Policy and Growth          11
In both East Asia and Latin America, exports were based on the productive capacity and expertise 
developed during import substitution.21 The Latin American automotive industry is an obvious case in 
point. Transnational corporations initially invested so as not to lose potentially lucrative markets when most 
countries became closed to imports. They were first pushed into exporting through government programs. 
Moreover, the industry remains one of the key exceptions to liberalization, subject to special sectoral policies 
throughout the region.22
Indeed, the logic behind import-substitution policies was to force firms to make large investments 
that were not easily reversible. These investments constrained a firm’s options; they were subsequently forced 
to consider the need to protect access to these markets and their past investments, which they did not treat as 
sunk costs (Shapiro 1994). Given the acknowledged importance of path dependence, and the fact that many 
of the successful sectors and firms got their start under import substitution, it is difficult to attribute growth 
in the recent period only to liberalization policies. 
In addition, non-traditional exports that were distinct from products initially produced for the 
domestic market, and were therefore not the outcome of import-substitution policies per se, were usually 
produced by the same firms that did maturate under the import-substitution regime. To the extent that 
managerial and technological capabilities at the firm level are key to development, then acknowledging this 
continuity of major firms is critical.23 Work by Roberts and Tybout (1995) on Colombian exports and Malo-
ney and Azevedo (1995) on Mexico reinforces this point. Costs associated with entering export markets lead 
to path dependence, in that firms already exporting are more likely to continue doing so. 
These issues raise the more general question of the appropriate time frame in which to assess indus-
trial policy impact. This is true for both East Asia and Latin America. Indeed, some observers have begun to 
look to ‘initial conditions’ that predate any industrial policies to explain relative success or failure.24 
Finally, there is a peculiar ‘back to the future’ quality with respect to Latin America’s situation, 
similar to the trends in the theoretical literature. Liberalization was expected to increase efficiency at a micro 
level, which in turn would help address its macro balance-of-payments problems. Similarly, import substitu-
tion was adopted in part to overcome the region’s chronic external imbalances by reducing its dependence 
on raw material exports and manufactured imports. As first noted by Diaz-Alejandro, import-substituting 
industrialization paradoxically made countries even more dependent on imports, at least in the short run, 
and therefore growth more vulnerable to an import constraint. Likewise, although exports have increased 
under liberalization, imports have risen even more, in part due to the vertical de-integration of the manufac-
turing sector. As discussed above, many observers today are concerned about an ever-more binding balance-
of-payments constraint.25 The restructuring processes underway also raise the question of whether what is 
good for the ‘competitive firm’ is good for national development more broadly, since what works for a subset 
of firms may make the national economy more prone to balance-of-payments crises and slower growth in the 
short to medium run. 
21  See Shapiro (2003). For a discussion on Turkey’s export ‘miracle’ of the 1980s, which was also based on a preexisting 
industrial based created during import substitution, see Boratav (1988). 
22  See Katz and Stumpo (2001) for the role of industrial policy in revitalizing the Latin American auto industry in recent 
decades.
23  Amsden (2001: 173) elaborates on this point.
24  See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), and Ros (2001). 
25  Katz and Stumpo (2001) also note the similarities to the debate over balance of payments in the 1950s.12  DESA Working Paper No. 53
Other characteristics are disturbingly familiar to an earlier phase. In the 1950s and 1960s, Latin 
America was concerned about finding itself in raw materials with low income and price elasticity of demand; 
today it still finds itself at the low-growth, commodity end of the industrial spectrum. While its export 
industries are no longer the raw material export enclaves of the past, they have become increasingly de-linked 
from the domestic economy as they move towards the assembly of imported parts and components while the 
design and technology intensive activities are done elsewhere.
Conclusion
In many ways, theories of industrialization have come full circle. Fifty years ago, the reigning paradigm 
considered market failure to be endemic. After years of being discredited or ignored, many of the assump-
tions behind this paradigm have been made a comeback. The policy implications of these theories, however, 
have not been similarly resurrected. In contrast to their predecessors, contemporary theorists of market 
failure have been reticent about policy recommendations. Given the acknowledged limitations of import-
substitution policies, scepticism about government capacity, and a very different global economy, this is not 
surprising. Moreover, the challenge facing the more developed countries – making the existing industrial 
infrastructure more competitive, or upgrading technological capabilities – requires different approaches to 
that of kick-starting industrialization. 
The default policy recommendation is still the market (see World Bank, 2002; Nolan and Pack, 
2003).26 The emphasis of reform has switched to institutions that will allow the market to perform more ef-
ficiently. Given the weakening theoretical and empirical foundations for market-based solutions, the assump-
tion that state failure is always worse than market failure needs to be reconsidered.
26  See World Bank (2002) and Nolan and Pack (2003).Industrial Policy and Growth          13
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